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Abstract 
 
The future role for methodology will be conditioned both by the way in which its 
content has developed in the direction of pluralism, and by the growth and 
specialisation of the field. The paper suggests that, for methodology to steer a 
successful course between foundationalism and relativism, there needs to be clarity 
about the meta-methodological frameworks which methodologists employ (since the 
pluralism applies to the fields of methodology and philosophy as well as economics 
per se). The case is made for regarding both the philosophy and methodology which 
ground practice as provisional, open to influence from practice itself. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The field of methodology has gone through dramatic changes over the last few 
decades, not only in terms of content, but also in terms of the growth in the 
community of methodologists. Both developments raise the possibility that 
methodology’s role has also changed. 
 
The content of the field has changed in the direction of pluralism. Prior to the 1970s 
the small specialist methodological literature offered a limited, albeit sophisticated, 
range of methodological positions which in turn referred to a limited range of 
positions in the philosophy of science (such as some version of logical positivism or 
Popperianism). The general presumption was that it was feasible that agreement might 
be reached on the appraisal of methodology and philosophy of science, in the same 
way as agreement might be reached on the appraisal of economic theory. But now the 
content is more pluralist in a variety of senses (see Salanti and Screpanti, 1997). Not 
only is there a greater choice of both philosophies of science and methodology, but 
also there is no longer the same strength of expectation that agreement will be reached 
on how to appraise the various possibilities.  
 
As if this doesn’t make it difficult enough for practising economists seeking guidance 
from methodology, the field has become so large and specialised that much of the 
literature is inaccessible to outsiders. This growth raises particular sociological and 
rhetorical issues in terms of the relationship between economic methodology and  
economic practice. Indeed for some these sociological and rhetorical issues, as 
applied to economics itself, should replace conventional methodological discussion.  
 
It is the purpose of this paper to consider the issues for methodology raised by this 
state of affairs. Specifically, we consider first the role for methodology in this 
pluralist environment. Then we focus on the communications issues raised by this 
role, and finally the relationship between methodology and both practice and 
philosophy are considered. The perspective adopted here is that of the practising 
economisti: what does modern methodology have to offer? 
 
 
2. The Pluralist Environment 
 
As Hands (2000) argues, the ‘new methodology’ occupies a middle ground between 
foundationalism and relativism. Relativism had been a reaction to the foundationalist 
position that philosophy of science, and therefore methodologists, could feasibly 
establish guidelines for practice. During the 1980s and much of the 1990s, therefore, 
much of methodology veered in the direction of description rather than prescription. 
This phase was enormously productive in providing accounts of practice, an exercise 
which was not required by the foundationalist approach. But it was untenable to 
regard this as an exercise in pure description. Any account requires some kind of 
framework, or organising principles (such as Lakatos’s Scientific Research Programs, 
or a focus on sociology, or on rhetoric, for example). Thus, although some of those 
who still aim to offer a non-prescriptive account of economics, as in the modern 
science studies approach, might demur from the term ‘methodology’, it is used here in 
a broad enough way to include all work which is concerned with the methods of 
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conduct of economics. The pluralism we are concerned with therefore refers to the 
multiplicity of organising principles for such study. 
 
The middle ground between foundationalism and relativism is populated by 
methodological analyses which, whether they purport to appraise or to describe, lay 
no claim to the capacity to reveal truth. This does not preclude the advocacy of 
particular frameworks; it is simply a recognition of fallibilism. But the act of choosing 
a framework involves (implicitly or explicitly) an appraisal of the range of possible 
approaches, and is thus to some extent prescriptive at a meta-methodological level. 
Thus even the explicitly non-prescriptive science studies approach embodies the 
judgement that this is the best way to organise a study of economic method. Implicit 
in most frameworks is also some form of prescriptive methodological stance: in a 
Lakatosian approach, for example, progress is identified on specific empirical grounds 
(understood in a particular way); McCloskey advocates a sprachethik as a guide to 
good rhetorical practice; critical realists advocate a particular view of what science 
can and cannot do; econometric methodologists advocate one approach or set of 
techniques over another. But, since there is no overarching framework on offer within 
which these analyses may be placed, how is the practising economist to navigate these 
waters?  
 
Elsewhere (Dow, 1997) I have advocated a modified pluralism as a constructive 
methodology. The case was based on the argument that, while we have the best 
chance of building up a rounded picture of reality and its causal mechanisms by using 
a wide range of methods, a pure pluralist or eclectic methodology is unworkable. It 
would truly be a case of ‘anything goes’. (The active tolerance of the postmodern 
approach, while attractive as such, does not help the economist to choose a way of 
going about practice.) The task then is for the economist to narrow down the range of 
methods, the questions to be addressed and so on; implicitly or explicitly this is done 
on the basis of world-view, or ontology (which could, for example, be a postmodern 
ontology of a fragmented reality). The resulting practice works most successfully not 
only if each economist operates within a community with a shared ontology, and a 
shared view of the range of methods to be used, questions to be asked etc, but also if 
there is sufficient awareness of alternative approaches to foster creative cross-
fertilisation, as opposed to conflict. 
 
The same argument carries forward into the field of methodology itself. As 
methodologists, we have our own ontologies, our own views as to the questions to be 
asked, the means to address them, and so on. In making this argument, I am of course 
employing a meta-methodological framework for analysing methodology, as would 
any methodologist. I could provide a philosophical justification of this framework, but 
then there is the question of appraisal of alternative philosophical frameworks, none 
of which in turn can reasonably be regarded as laying claim to truth either. 
 
It appears that the whole business is circular; there is no escaping the pluralism of 
methodologies or of philosophies. How should methodology proceed? 
 
To assist in answering this question, let us pause to consider the possible purposes of 
methodology. I would suggest that the new methodology embodies variously some or 
all of the following four purposes: 
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1. to inform debates in economics which have methodological origins 
2. to reveal issues in economic practice as yet unaddressed 
3. to guide progress in economics 
4. to construct an analytical account of economic methodology. 
 
In order to perform these functions, methodologists need to identify first the 
philosophical and methodological underpinnings of current practice. Where the 
underpinnings of the practice of protagonists in economics debate are different, the 
methodologist can clarify the nature of the debate by bringing these underpinnings to 
the surface. Where the methodologist can identify apparent incompatibilities between 
underpinnings and practice, the methodologist can make this clear to the economist, 
implying that underpinnings, practice, or both, require attention. All(!) this requires of 
the methodologist is the openness of mind to take on board a wide range of 
philosophical and methodological positions and to exercise the capacity to consider 
each body of economic practice on its own terms. For many this would be 
uncontroversial, although it is not at all straightforward to implement. The 
significance of context makes it hard for the methodologist to enter successfully into a 
range of different contexts. Indeed in practice it is hard to identify where the second 
role stops and the third begins. 
 
It is the third role which is most clearly problematic in a pluralist environment, 
because different notions of progress can arise from methodological study and from 
practice. Foundationalist methodology saw its role primarily in this third category, 
and sought to establish agreement on criteria for progress. But in a pluralist 
methodological environment, the notion of progress itself is specific to each different 
approach (see Dow, 2000). As we saw, each approach has its own prescriptive 
program, unless it denies the third role altogether.  
 
But even the fourth role, evident most notably in the science studies approach, is 
problematic. Just as discussion of historiography is focusing, among other things, on 
the significance of the framework of the commentator, so a methodologist 
reconstructing a methodological account of a particular theoretical development 
inevitably employs a framework.  
 
The best we can hope to do, given the circularity of any justification, is to be explicit 
about the philosophical principles we bring to methodology and the methodological 
principles we bring to questions of practice. Just as it is a major role for the 
methodologist to tease out the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of 
economists, so it is incumbent on methodologists to be clear (within the community of 
methodologists as well as to practising economists) about their own underpinnings. 
Then practicing economists have some idea of what they are taking on board with a 
particular methodological framework. But this is easier said than done; it requires 
good communication, which involves sociological and rhetorical, as well as 
epistemological issues.ii We turn to questions of communication in the next section. 
 
 
5. Communications Issues 
 
Communication is central to the success of the methodologist’s role if it is defined at 
all in relation to practice. If we think of the methodological literature which has had 
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most impact on the profession, it falls roughly into two categories. First, there is the 
hangover from the foundationalist era when methodology was treated hierarchically, 
drawing on philosophy of science and communicating guidance to economists. It is in 
this tradition that we find what used to be a standard element in the Introduction to 
introductory texts: an account of Popper’s falsificationism, a drawing of the 
distinction between the normative and the positive, a contrasting of induction with 
deduction, and so on. Modern methodology tells us that these accounts usually 
misrepresented traditional methodology. First these ideas did not in fact emerge 
untainted by contextual considerations; it was a two-way process between philosophy 
of science and science. Second, the methodological literature fills out the full 
complexity of these various concepts and ideas which does not come across in 
introductory textbook treatments. But in addition it has been pointed out (notably by 
Blaug, 1980) that there is a wide divergence between this traditional approach to 
economics and practice.  
 
While Blaug’s book has had a sufficiently high profile that many practicing 
economists will be aware of his charge, there is no evidence of a change in practice 
towards conforming with traditional methodology. Aside from the natural 
unwillingness to take criticism on board, there was a further influence which 
encouraged economists simply to ignore methodology as traditionally understood. 
This strand of influence has come from practice itself – and in particular from 
influential practitioners. Thus a key publication was Friedman’s (1953) case for 
instrumentalism, which was crucial in enhancing the significance of the predictive 
success of his monetarist model. He sparked off an argument about methodology 
whose importance stemmed from the debate over macroeconomic theory, but which at 
the same time questioned the relevance of much of the existing methodological 
literature concerned with theory construction. Another key publication was 
McCloskey’s (1983) article on the significance of rhetoric. Coming to methodology as 
a respected cliometrician, McCloskey advocated the end of ‘Methodology’, meaning 
the older, prescriptive foundationalist methodology. But while McCloskey 
encouraged a fruitful new development within the new methodology literature (the 
study of rhetoric), the original article served to provide a further justification for 
practitioners to ignore methodology altogether.  
 
Perhaps the most successful methodological work, in terms of impact, has been in the 
field of econometrics; practising econometricians tend to have a familiarity with the 
arguments of key figures, such as Sims, Leamer and Hendry, which is not common in 
relation to the rest of the methodological literature. This literature makes clear 
prescriptions in terms of econometric practice which can generally be understood, and 
taken on board by practitioners. As a form of methodological study clearly embedded 
in practice, this particular aspect of methodology has for many come to be understood 
as being coterminous with methodology as a whole. Further, since the tone in the 
econometric methodology literature is highly prescriptive, the impression is left that 
methodology is still foundationalist. 
 
A fundamental problem for the rest of the methodological community therefore is 
how to get across the fact that the field, understood more broadly, has changed so 
radically, and is more concerned than in the past to understand practice and address 
issues arising from practice. The issue needs to be addressed that most economists 
probably identify methodology with McCloskey’s ‘Methodology’, and feel more 
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justified now in not giving it their attention There is the more complex question of 
getting across the content, as opposed to the nature, of the new methodology. In order 
to address this question we turn to consider the relationship between philosophy, 
methodology and practice. In the process we consider Smith’s (1762-63) argument 
that the communication of ideas and their development are interdependent. 
 
 
4. Relationship between Philosophy, Methodology and Practice 
 
It is conventional to think of economic methodology in terms of a hierarchy: 
philosophy, methodology and practice. Indeed it has been a notable feature of some of 
the new methodology to open up the philosophical end of the hierarchy. A range of 
philosophical positions has been developed – different versions of realism, 
postmodernism, critical rationalism etc. It is then demonstrated that (whatever the 
starting point for the philosophy itself) taking any one of these positions as a starting-
point determines a particular approach to methodology, and in turn to practice. It is 
clear, then, that practising economists are implicitly making philosophical choices as 
well as methodological choices. If methodology is to perform any of the functions 
outlined above, then methodologists must be able to communicate with practitioners 
on the subject of philosophy as well as methodology. 
 
If this were all, then the issue would be a purely pedagogic one, albeit an extremely 
challenging one. Clearly it is unreasonable to expect all economists to have the time, 
the skills or the inclination to understand the richness of the relevant methodological 
literature. It is up to methodologists to distil what is important and communicate it 
effectively. The same applies to philosophers. Since methodologists themselves 
implicitly or explicitly make philosophical choices, it is up to philosophers to put their 
arguments in such a way as to allow informed choice among those not trained in 
philosophy. In particular, if the case is being made for one philosophical approach 
over another, the gist of the arguments on different sides should be made generally 
accessible. 
 
But the matter does not end here. In general, the notion of hierarchical authority is no 
longer generally accepted; neither philosophical arguments nor methodological 
arguments are taken on authority.  In any case the whole notion of a hierarchy can be 
dangerously misleading, not only sociologically, but also epistemologically. 
Philosophy does not emerge from a vacuum, but from a context of which practice is a 
part. Therefore, while there is a logical hierarchy in that philosophy holds 
implications for methodology, and methodology for practice, practice in turn can hold 
implications for methodology and for philosophy. The recognition of this factor is 
important, not only for communications with practicing economists, but also for the 
content of methodology and philosophy. Thus, in particular, descriptive methodology, 
which is probably closest to practice, can play an important role in feeding material 
back into the development of methodology and philosophy. Smith (1762-63) 
suggested that there is less scope for the social sciences to go badly off-track than the 
physical sciences, because it was easier for the audience to relate the results of social 
science to their own experience. Further, he argued that the art of persuasion requires 
that attention be paid to the nature of the audience and to how to relate theory to what 
is already familiar to that audience; reason is employed where theory goes against 
common sense understanding, but there has to be some common ground (some basis 
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for sympathy) as a starting-point for communication. Part of the process of theory 
development (in methodology as in economics) is to recognise when an inability to 
persuade is due to unsuccessful communication skills and when it is due to some 
inadequacy in the theory. 
 
The emergence of the new methodology coincided with a move away from the 
methodologist (or philosopher) as authority. This was only one aspect of a more 
general move against authoritarianism, which encouraged economists not to feel 
bound by methodological strictures developed elsewhere. But economists do adhere 
to methodological strictures which are in general implicit. The fact that the new 
methodology takes seriously the methodology implicit in practice should, were it 
more generally known, endear methodologists more to practicing economists.  
 
It was through considering how practice evolves that the current pluralism of 
methodologies, and philosophies, emerged. What is important now is that the 
resulting distinct approaches do not become invariant in the face of practice, so that 
the hierarchy of influence settles back into a uni-directional phenomenon, with the 
only influence running from philosophy to methodology to practice. Where some 
disparity appears between philosophy, methodology and practice, everything should 
be open for discussion; in a fallibilist, pluralist methodological environment, 
philosophical and methodological underpinnings can only be regarded as provisional 
and open to reasoned argument. The importance of the new methodology is that it 
offers a range of approached to practitioners and it is incumbent on methodologists to 
make their choice as informed as possible. But if methodology reverts to a state in 
which the options no longer connect with the concerns facing practitioners, the scope 
for influence will again be lost.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We have arrived at the point of emphasising the importance of economic practice in 
influencing methodology, a common theme in the new methodology. The emphasis 
has been put on the scope for economic practice to influence the practice of 
methodology as well as its content. In turn, it has been suggested that methodology 
can perform a range of functions designed to enlighten and inform economic practice. 
For the two-way influence to be successful there has to be effective communication 
between the levels of philosophy, methodology and practice, based on mutual 
understanding and Smithian sympathy.  
 
There is no ultimate scope for escaping the circularity involved in employing 
frameworks for methodology, or philosophy. But the more informed philosophers, 
methodologists and economists are about the nature of the various frameworks and 
what they entail, the more effective will be the communication, the more readily will 
economists understand the full range of possibilities which the new methodology can 
offer, and the more practising economists will be able to exert their own influence on 
the field.  
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i In what follows, I will refer at times to ‘methodologists’ as distinct from ‘practising economists’ 
although there are of course many individuals who operate in both economics and economic 
methodology. 
ii Adam Smith’s work on rhetoric provides a rich source on the subject of combining rhetoric, 
sociology and epistemology when considering both the communication and development of philosophy 
and science; see Dow (1999). 
